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Wittgenstein, Hume and Naturalism1 
 
Benedict Smith 
Durham University, UK 
 
According to Bernard Williams Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientific naturalism led him to reject 
explanation of phenomena as a philosophical goal. Williams claims that this rejection was driven by a 
distinctive conception of the subject matter of philosophy as “exclusively a priori”. I suggest that 
Wittgenstein’s opposition is directed against a particular form of explanation understood as central to a 
‘scientific attitude’. Wittgenstein also regarded the subject matter of philosophy as incorporating “the 
phenomena of every-day” and he was careful to emphasize the importance of identifying and 
considering our actual practices and experiences in providing insight into the nature of meaning and 
understanding. To provide an alternative to Williams’s view this chapter compares Wittgenstein’s 
naturalism to Hume’s. Humean naturalism is sometimes assumed to have paved the way for scientism. 
Yet, for Hume, “the cautious observation of human life” was central to philosophical method, central to 
the “science of human nature”. There are important differences between Hume and Wittgenstein. But 
recognizing the elements arguably shared by them can provide a better way to characterize 
Wittgenstein’s naturalism. This helps clarify the role Wittgenstein gave to human practice and 
experience and demonstrates that his attitude to the subject matter of philosophy was not ‘exclusively a 
priori’. 
 
 
Introduction 
One of the many things that makes Wittgenstein’s philosophical work distinctive is 
the sustained interest in the nature of philosophy itself. This interest is expressed 
throughout his writings from the earliest notes and drafts of the Tractatus to his 
remarks up to the late 1940’s and including the months before he died. It is unusual to 
find a person for whom the character of philosophy received so much attention and 
over such a sustained period of time. Throughout his writings, albeit in different ways, 
Wittgenstein insisted on the independence of philosophy from science. And that 
insistence has been taken as evidence that he was an anti-naturalist. That would 
follow, however, only if naturalism is a view about how philosophy should privilege 
science. But that understanding of naturalism is contestable. Clarifying Wittgenstein’s 
relation to naturalism is not easy but one way is to consider how his work aligns with 
the naturalism of Hume. Initially this may seem a questionable strategy since the two 
appear to differ substantially over basic philosophical commitments and are 
seemingly quite opposed to one another on questions of methodology. But a 
comparison with Hume is illuminating in a number of ways.  
For some it is not obvious that Wittgenstein is any kind of naturalist at all, let 
alone one who shares that view with a figure often interpreted to have championed 
___________________________ 
1
 Forthcoming in Wittgenstein and Naturalism, Cahill and Raleigh eds. (Routledge). 
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what is now known as scientism. And there are broader issues too. If Hacker is right 
Hume “made almost every epistemological and metaphysical mistake Wittgenstein 
could think of”.2 There are indeed many ways that Hume’s work contrasts with 
Wittgenstein’s but there are deep affinities too. These affinities can be overlooked 
because of a tendency to misread Hume’s naturalism as a forerunner to what now 
counts as scientific naturalism and, relatedly, to construe Wittgenstein’s suspicions 
with regard to the use of scientific method in philosophy to express an anti-
naturalism. Against this last idea, Strawson writes of how the resemblances between 
them and the ‘echoes’ of Hume in Wittgenstein’s work are more striking than the 
differences.
3
 And I think in the context of clarifying Wittgenstein’s naturalism the 
affinities are particularly instructive as are the lessons for how we might characterize 
contemporary philosophical naturalism more broadly.  
Pears describes Wittgenstein’s naturalism as inspired by a conception of 
philosophical method which consists in portraying what we find in daily life;
4
 an 
echo, I take it, of Hume’s conception of naturalistic method as grounded in the 
“cautious observation of human life” and of characterizing the features of our lives 
“as they appear in the common course of the world”.5 There is (almost) no opposition 
to the idea that Hume is a naturalist although there are significant differences over 
which kind of naturalism is most relevant. As indicated, one approach is to portray 
him as paving the way for scientism and thus as quite inconsistent with Wittgenstein’s 
anti-scientism. But there are other kinds of naturalism in Hume, those that have been 
interpreted as more ‘liberal’ and at least non-scientistic in the sense developed by a 
number of contemporary authors.
6
  
___________________________ 
2
 P.M.S Hacker Hacker, P.M.S.  Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 218. See also O. Hanfling “Hume and Wittgenstein,” Royal Institute 
of Philosophy Lectures 9, (1975): 47. 
3
 P.F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (London: Methuen & Co., 1985): 14. 
For others that emphasize the affinities between Hume and Wittgenstein see, for example, P. Jones, 
“Strains in Hume and Wittgenstein,” in Hume: A Re-evaluation, ed. Donald W. Livingstone and James 
T. King (New York: Fordham University Press 1976): 191-209; B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: 
An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).   
4
 D. Pears, “Wittgenstein’s Naturalism,” The Monist, 78, no.3 (1995): 411.  
5
 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978): xix. 
Doubtless there are other ‘naturalisms’ in Hume that would fit uneasily with this kind, those that 
motivate Hacker’s remark above for example. There has been a tendency to underplay the diversity of 
Hume’s view in this regard.  
6
 See for example, the essays in M. de Caro, and D. Macarthur, eds. Naturalism in Question. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004 and M. de Caro, and D. Macarthur, eds. Naturalism 
and Normativity. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.  
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Despite other changes during the development of Wittgenstein’s thought a 
theme that persists is the insistence that philosophy and science are distinct. That view 
is taken to expresses a clear anti-naturalism. According to Flanagan, for example, 
Wittgenstein is anti-naturalist because he denies that philosophy is more or less 
related to any of the natural sciences: psychology, and Darwinism, for example, are 
taken by Wittgenstein to be both equally independent of philosophy and there is no 
sense that philosophy can be informed at all by any of the natural sciences.
7
 Flanagan 
chooses to use Quine’s view as the arbiter of what counts as naturalism, at least for 
the purposes of characterizing Wittgenstein as an anti-naturalist.
8
 But Quine’s view 
need not be taken as the arbiter and there are a number of reasons – some of them 
Humean – to resist doing so. Despite Quine’s appeal to Hume as a forerunner of the 
“epistemological enterprise in [its] new psychological setting”9 the latter would not, I 
think, easily recognize the idea that epistemology studies “a physical human 
subject”.10 The principal subject matter of what Hume calls “the science of human 
nature”11 is not a physical human subject but persons; not transitions between 
experiential input in the form of “patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies” and 
conceptual output in the form of descriptions of the world and its history as Quine 
puts it.
12
 Hume’s naturalism encompasses more than a psychological characterization 
of belief-formation.  
In the next section I consider Bernard Williams’s remarks about how 
Wittgenstein rejected explanation and conceived the subject matter of philosophy as 
exclusively a priori. I suggest that Wittgenstein had a nuanced view about what 
explanation can provide and, in the following section, develop how that is related to 
experience and belief. I then sketch the implications for ways that we can understand 
philosophical naturalism.  
 
___________________________ 
7
 O. Flanagan, “Varieties of Naturalism,” in The Oxford Companion to Religion and Science ed. Philip 
Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 432. 
8
 Flanagan also suggests that Wittgenstein’s ‘anti-naturalism’ is allegedly inferior to other versions, 
O.K. Bouwsma’s for example, because Wittgenstein merely stipulates anti-naturalism and does not 
argue for it. I have discussed Wittgenstein’s relation to scientism in B. Smith, “Wittgenstein, 
Naturalism and Scientism”, in Wittgenstein and Scientism, ed. Jonathan Beale and Ian James Kidd, 
(London: Routledge, 2017 forthcoming).   
9
 W.V.O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”, in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary 
Epistemology, ed. Sven Bernecker and Fred Dretske, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 274.  
10
 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”, 273. 
11
 Hume, Treatise, xvii. 
12
 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”, 274. 
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The Subject Matter of Philosophy and the a priori 
The scientistic naturalism to which Wittgenstein is opposed involves, amongst other 
things, a “smug and unexamined assurance that what wants explanation is obvious, 
and that scientific tools are immediately applicable” as Goldfarb puts it.13 But in the 
course of exposing that assurance Wittgenstein’s view allegedly incorporates a 
problematic opposition to explanation as such; problematic since it seems to embody 
a dogmatic scepticism about the value of any empirical investigation in the context of 
clarifying and responding to philosophical problems. And this assumes a distinctive 
view about the subject matter of philosophy. A related interpretation is proposed by 
Bernard Williams who suggests that according to Wittgenstein “philosophy had 
nothing to do with explanations – not merely scientific explanations ... but any 
explanations at all”. As a result Wittgenstein regarded the subject matter of 
philosophy as being “exclusively a priori”.14 But the view that philosophy’s subject 
matter is a priori in the sense Williams intends cannot, it seems to me, be easily 
accommodated by Wittgenstein’s naturalism. To show why involves considering what 
it is about explanation, particularly empirical explanation, that Wittgenstein opposed. 
Wittgenstein famously suggests that what it takes to frame our subject matter 
in the right way is ‘description’ since explanation, a core component in the scientific 
attitude, is to be done away with.
15
 Description is a process through which we remind 
ourselves of the familiar ordinary practical contexts within which meaning, 
understanding, word-use, concept application, and so on, are embedded and 
inextricably entwined with our agency. According to Wittgenstein it is this familiarity 
that makes our subject matter potentially hard to get into focus: “One cannot notice 
something because it is in front of one. Our subject matter is there if only we remove 
the prejudice that obscures it”.16 Our ‘disquietudes’ are not properly understood let 
alone addressed by providing explanations that attempt to reach behind the 
phenomena, as it were. Rather they are addressed through achieving the right kind of 
___________________________ 
13
 W. Goldfarb, “Wittgenstein, Mind, and Scientism,” The Journal of Philosophy 86, no.11 (1989): 
367.  
14
 B. Williams, “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline.” Philosophy 75, (2000): 493. See also 
Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 283 n.23. 
15
 PI §109. 
16
 PI §340. 
Penultimate Draft  
 
5 
perspective on what is already there as it is constituted in the midst of our practical 
existence. So in that sense we are reminded of what we are already familiar with and 
understand since our practices – our lives – are partly made by such understanding. 
This is unlike a different, more ‘scientific’, subject matter which is not already partly 
constituted by our practices and thus illuminating it cannot be achieved by 
“description alone”.17 It is the failure to differentiate the subject matter in each case 
that results in a tendency to treat our philosophical questions as if they were scientific 
in structure, and thus admit of explanations that, when successful, identify new and 
perhaps quite unfamiliar facts. The scientific attitude, one that embodies a certain kind 
of explanatory urge, assumes that we need to look past the manifest subject matter to 
something more basic “as if we had to penetrate phenomena”.18  
The a priori in Williams’s sense concerns a subject matter that contains 
potential objects of understanding that are fully intelligible independently of all 
experience. But adverting to what is intelligible in this sense is a priori in a 
problematic way. It is possible to employ this use of a priori, as Williams does, but it 
arguably encompasses too much. For example, this a priori would also capture a 
significant part of how Hume characterizes his basic methodological approach and 
thus it brings into question its suggested relevance in the specific case of 
Wittgenstein. I will come back to this in the next section. But the opposition between 
explanation and description is not best read, I think, as expressing scepticism about 
explanation as such, as if our subject matter is strangely inexplicable whilst being at 
the same time describable. The scepticism about explanation is directed to a particular 
kind of attitude toward inquiry not a rejection of the idea that the features under 
question can be explained at all.  
Wittgenstein does not provide much explicit detail as to which kinds of 
explanation his critical remarks are directed against and to which they are not. At any 
rate, the idea that he was somehow simply anti-explanation is not obviously right. It 
would be peculiarly un-Wittgensteinian to suppose that there is something illegitimate 
in the very idea of explanation; un-Wittgensteinian partly because that would itself 
rely on a form of essentialism about concepts and our forms of understanding that he 
clearly rejected. Just as there are many things we call ‘games’, “there are all sorts of 
___________________________ 
17
 PI §109. 
18
 PI §90. 
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things we call “explanation of meaning””.19 So we ought to be mindful of the 
complex status of explanation, a complexity that might be overlooked if one considers 
only those remarks that appear to dismiss the value of explanation outright. 
 In The Big Typescript, for example, and in subsequent work, Wittgenstein 
often explores the relation between explanation and understanding, particularly the 
way that explanation ‘correlates’ with understanding as he puts it. In some cases 
explanation can potentially exorcize misunderstanding and hence is used in a different 
way to how explanation is often referred to in the Philosophical Investigations.
20
 In 
the latter work explanation takes a more specific and a particularly empirical shape 
and, to that extent, it was deemed misleading in the context of addressing 
philosophical problems. Despite some inevitable vagueness, Wittgenstein had a 
specific form of explanation as the principal target of his criticism and in a way that 
was connected with his proposals that an alternative attitude, description, would 
faithfully preserve our subject matter. But preservation is, I take it, an activity that can 
often demand a good deal of work, one that involves “clearing misunderstandings 
away”21 and so the preservation in question is more like the conservation of a living 
dynamic natural environment, not like preserving an object in a form of suspended 
animation such as a cryogenic stasis. That can seem a peripheral point but it 
highlights how the wider context of Wittgenstein’s scepticism about explanation does 
not imply a dogmatic refusal to seek ways to change and advance our understanding.  
 A key theme in the Philosophical Investigations is resistance to the idea that 
grasp of the meaning of a concept amounts to possessing the right kind of mental 
state, a state that constitutes knowing how to extend a series of numbers according to 
a learned formulation, say. Wittgenstein’s suggestive remark in this context that the 
grammar (in his sense) of ‘know’ is related to that of ‘can’ and ‘is able to’22 points to 
the essentially practical character of what understanding amounts to, an understanding 
that is not locatable inside a person’s head or across instances of past behavior. The 
investigations of rule following involve a dialectic centered on the differing 
perspectives of instructor and learner in order to reveal the character of understanding, 
in particular the kind of practical context-bound mastery a person comes to take on, 
___________________________ 
19
 BT 59. 
20
 BT 17.  
21
 PI §90. 
22
 PI §150. 
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an ability that exhibits a change in the “way of looking at things”.23 This change is 
grounded in a capacity to compare cases and examples and is reflected in what we 
come to know through a grammatical investigation: “the kind of understanding that 
consists in ‘seeing connexions’”.24  
 The connections here are not the ones posited by rival empirical explanations, 
connections that purportedly underpin the phenomena in question: the connections 
and our sensitivity to them constitute the phenomena when regarded by a clear view 
enabled by a grammatical investigation. In the Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics Wittgenstein writes that in the face of disquietudes “[p]hilosophical 
dissatisfaction disappears by our seeing more”.25 So the question of development or in 
some sense a change of view on our subject matter is not in question. What is 
problematic is to attempt a change of view by using explanations of the sort typically 
employed in scientific practice and illicitly borrowed for philosophical purposes. So 
there are forms of activity, particularly being able to compare cases, to catch on to 
patterns and form awareness of how examples are related, that Wittgenstein thinks are 
crucial and irreducible components in what constitutes understanding but resist, at 
least in the relevant sense, explanation.  
 For Pears, there is no reason for Wittgenstein, or anyone else, to rule out a 
priori from our investigations the value of empirical findings, at least from our 
responses to the problems that we have discovered even if they arise from the 
misunderstanding of language.
26
 This is a similar idea to Williams’s. Both Pears and 
Williams regard Wittgenstein’s suspicions about the ‘scientific way of thinking’ to 
dogmatically rule out the very idea that the accumulation of facts and empirical 
explanations could ever contribute to our understanding. But Williams also notes that 
there are kinds of explanation that Wittgenstein embraced, “philosophical 
explanations”, which are distinctive since these are “like elucidations or reminders”.27  
 I am suggesting that there is more to Wittgenstein’s apparent animus towards 
explanation than unconditional rejection and also that there is a dynamic role for the 
kinds of explanation that Wittgenstein acknowledged. A ‘philosophical explanation’ 
or an elucidation can, I think, be more than a simple reminder but involve a process of 
___________________________ 
23
 PI §144. 
24
 PI §122. 
25
 RFM II 85. Wittgenstein’s emphasis. 
26
 Pears, “Wittgenstein’s Naturalism”, 423. 
27
 Williams, “Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline”, 493.  
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coming to a new kind of understanding even if that is not one grounded in awareness 
of new facts lying behind the phenomena in question. In my view, elucidatory or 
philosophical explanations in Williams’s sense are also forms of naturalistic 
explanation but in which there is no place for an alleged explanans that underpins 
what otherwise “lies open to view”.28 Elucidatory explanations are normative to the 
extent that they help to make phenomena intelligible by contextualizing them in 
amongst our lived experiences which constitute their “original home”.29 
 At one point in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein characterizes the 
way in which potential explanations of meaning must make use of language “full-
blown”.30 That is, language, as the etymology suggests, as fully developed, as in 
blossom as it were. Competence with providing and receiving normative explanations 
requires immersion in and familiarity with a ‘language-game’. Wittgenstein 
emphasizes here, as elsewhere, that what comes to be embodied as a form of agency 
rooted in enculturation reflects how (some) “explanation has its foundation in 
training”.31 Again, a contrast would be with the scientistic “causal point of view”32 
that cannot make intelligible the normative possibilities of meaning that run through 
our understanding that is exhibited in ordinary life.
33
 Wittgenstein’s non-reductive 
naturalism, just as Hume’s, conceives our subject matter as irreducibly situated in 
socially articulated practical contexts and risks irreparable distortion if detached from 
them. That the subject matter of philosophy includes the taken for granted conditions 
of human life presupposed by the explicit activities of reflecting on what we 
ordinarily do is, in some sense, to characterize that subject matter as a priori, as 
available for thought independently from experience. But until that sense is clarified 
we risk missing the other ways that Wittgenstein’s thought regarded experience as 
inalienable to the project of clarifying the subject matter of philosophy and of 
illuminating how meaning and understanding permeate our lives. 
 
 
___________________________ 
28
 PI §126. 
29
 PI §116. For Hanfling these are ‘manifest explanations’ in contrast to the explanations of science that 
have ‘hidden’ facts as their target. See O. Hanfling, Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life (London: 
Routledge, 2002): 93. 
30
 PI §120. 
31
 Z §419. 
32
 CV 37. 
33
 PI §90. 
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Hume and Wittgenstein on Experience and Belief 
In §97 of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes that, like other words 
such as ‘language’ and ‘world’, if the term ‘experience’ is to have a use “it must be as 
humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door””. This suggests that we 
understand ‘experience’ to be ‘full-blown’ in the sense suggested in the previous 
section. That is, that in referring to experience and its role in meaning and 
understanding we need not use it in a narrow, peculiarly epistemological sense, even 
if philosophers have characteristically done so in a way that Wittgenstein found 
objectionable. By the epistemological sense of experience I mean, roughly, the idea of 
experience as playing a grounding or foundational role in our understanding. The 
discussion of what it is to grasp and follow a rule is again helpful. This epistemic 
sense of experience mistakenly portrays what it is to grasp a rule as an experience – a 
“special experience” – internal to the mind of a person in the midst of training, an 
experience that supposedly marks the transition between unsuccessful and successful 
grasp of a rule.
34
 But experience understood in an ordinary and ‘humble’ sense refers 
to a more general, socially articulated meaning that reconnects with the dimension of 
our practical embodied agency. So when he writes at §655 that “[t]he question is not 
one of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a 
language-game” what is problematic is the aspiration to use experience as somehow 
an explanation or justification for outward behavior. Noting a language-game is an 
activity that takes in our experiences in a wider sense, that captures what we say, 
think or do in the course of ordinary life; a more phenomenological characterization 
of experience.
35
  
___________________________ 
34
 PI §155. 
35
 In 1974 M. O’C. Drury wrote of an exchange with Wittgenstein in which the latter described his 
work as “‘phenomenology’”. See M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein”, in Recollections 
of Wittgenstein, ed. R. Rhees, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 116. See also Rhees’s 
comment at x-xi. At the time in question (c.1930) Wittgenstein was working on notes that were later 
published as Philosophical Remarks in which he makes the connection between his work and 
phenomenology. In other places, The Big Typescript for example, Wittgenstein also suggests that a 
grammatical investigation is a form of phenomenological investigation. There have been a number of 
attempts to unravel the intriguing connection that Wittgenstein made with phenomenology. See, for 
example:  T. N. Munson, “Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology”. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 23, no.1 (1962): 37-50; H. Spiegelberg, “The Puzzle of Wittgenstein’s Phänomenologie”. 
American Philosophical Quarterly 5. no.4 (1968): 244-56; N. F. Gier, Wittgenstein and 
Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty (Albany: SUNY Press, 1981) and, more recently, R. Monk, “The Temptations of 
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 Of course, the aim here is not to assess the complex connections between 
Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition but to gain a clearer view of the role 
of experience, in the way I am suggesting that it might understood, in relation to 
Hume’s naturalism. Roughly, a widespread view is that Hume’s ambition was to 
provide a scientifically respectable account of belief acquisition in the form of 
explaining the experiential foundation of our ideas in ways that avoid abstruse 
metaphysical assumptions. That is Hume’s so-called explanatory aim to be realized 
through the ‘experimental method’ that he advocated. On the other hand, Hume aimed 
to clarify the normative or rational credentials of belief by assessing whether belief 
can be justified, principally by one of two routes: by sense experience (‘the present 
testimony of sense’) or by a form of conceptual analysis (‘relations of ideas’). 
Notoriously many of our basic beliefs such as that the external world exists, that 
causal relations hold between objects, that objects exist when unperceived, cannot be 
justified and thus a form of scepticism follows. An influential interpretation holds that 
Hume’s explanatory aim contains the resources to respond to, if not refute, 
scepticism: unavoidable psychological mechanisms inevitably lead to the formation of 
belief such that the search for independent rational justification is shown to be 
incoherent.
36
 Nevertheless, Hume’s view is that the process of belief acquisition leads 
to our beliefs becoming ‘stable’ in a way that reliably connects them to truth. Hume 
has a naturalistic theory of justification, then, since truth-oriented stability is 
explained as grounded in psychological dispositions.
37
 And, according to Pears, had 
Hume known how the brain works his account would have moved “beyond 
psychology into neurology”.38 But it is questionable whether Hume’s commitment to 
the ‘experimental method’ implies a naturalistic reduction in this sense.  
 Hume appealed to features of our experience which presupposed an 
interpersonal environment, claims to which he assumed the community would readily 
assent on the basis of reflection. Yet what ‘experience’ means for Hume is not 
straightforward, taking in experience that is introspectively accessible by an 
individual but also experience that cannot be made intelligible other than in social 
___________________________ 
 
Phenomenology: Wittgenstein, the Synthetic a Priori and the ‘Analytic a Posteriori’”. International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 22, no.3 (2014): 312-340. 
36
 For example N. Kemp Smith The Philosophy of David Hume (London: MacMillan, 1941). 
37
 For example L. Loeb Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
38
 Pears, “Wittgenstein’s Naturalism”, 412. 
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contexts. The latter assumes a prior intersubjective understanding that could be made 
explicit by reflection. It is on the basis of prior understanding shared across 
communities, even humanity perhaps, that one might be persuaded of Hume’s views 
about, say, the role of sentiment in ethics and of the role of perceptual anticipation in 
the context of causal inference. According to Hanfling, the psychology invoked by 
Hume is not that of empirical science but “introspective and in that sense a priori. He 
wants us to notice that certain things are as he says, not to learn it from him”.39 Under 
one light Hume’s naturalism is a commitment to – even laying the foundations for – 
what is now known as scientism. Under another, it is a naturalism that consists in 
attending to our lived experiences and practice.
40
 If the latter is right, then Hume’s 
method whilst naturalistic is non-reductionist and more descriptive in a 
Wittgensteinian sense. What one comes to notice from such descriptions are forms of 
experience that constitute ordinary life and thus the subject matter of our investigation 
and the experimental method used to investigate it can be viewed as naturalistic but 
non-scientistic.  
 What Hume considered as ‘experiments’ and ‘experimental reasoning’ 
included diverse reflections on human life that often included considering historical 
events and practices: 
 
 [R]ecords of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections 
 of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the 
 principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or natural 
 philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other 
 external objects, by the experiments which he forms concerning them.
41
 
 
There is then a connection between philosophy and natural science in so far as we 
need to form understanding in light of experiments. But there is no suggestion of 
reducing what Hume’s calls “the science of man”42 or sometimes “the science of 
___________________________ 
39
 O. Hanfling, “Hume and Wittgenstein”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 9, (1975): 51. 
40
 For further discussion see B. Smith “Naturalism, Experience, and Hume’s ‘Science of Human 
Nature’”. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24, no.3 (2016): 310-323. 
41
 D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975): 83-84. 
42
 Hume, Treatise, xv. 
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human nature”43 to natural philosophy. In fact, quite the contrary. In the very last 
section of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein warns against the assumption 
that the existence of “experimental methods” in psychology contain the resources for 
solving the problems “which trouble us”; “problem and method pass each other by”, 
he writes.
44
 One might see a Humean view as the target yet doing so would assume a 
narrow conception of what Hume meant by experiment and experimental method. The 
science of man qua observation of ordinary life is basic and in fact presupposed by 
natural philosophy and other forms of enquiry: “[T]he science of man is the only solid 
foundation for the other sciences”.45 
Since the science of man in Hume’s sense is not dealing with inanimate 
objects in the world that can be manipulated and placed in experimental settings at 
will in order to “observe the results”, a different approach is needed. But in such an 
approach a form of observation is nevertheless still central. Hume writes: 
 
 We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious 
 observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course 
 of the world ... Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and 
 compared, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be 
 inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human 
 comprehension.
46
 
 
So, as we should expect, the philosophical study of human life and our practices is a 
different activity from observing how inanimate phenomena interact under the laws of 
physics. There is something distinctive about the source and object of the 
observations in the context of human life since what we are aiming at is an 
understanding of ourselves.  
In Hume’s treatment of causal belief one angle is a sceptical one: an 
impression of causation cannot be located as the experiential source of the relevant 
idea and, since denying a casual relation does not lead to a contradiction, the 
justificatory possibilities provided by Hume’s two-fold distinction alluded to above 
___________________________ 
43
 Hume, Treatise, xvii. 
44
 PI II, §xiv. 
45
 Hume, Treatise, xvi. 
46
 Hume, Treatise, xiii-xix. 
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are exhausted. But there is also a different angle, one that seeks to uncover a non-
rational “determination to carry our thought from one object to another” embodying 
our practice of causal inference.
47
 So one epistemic method of assessing causal 
inference is to “trace up” the origin of belief in the attempt to identify the relevant 
impression, a form of genetic analysis of ideas. An alternative approach illuminates 
our “natural instinct” for belief, as Hume put it;48 an example of how “Nature, by an 
absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge, as well as to 
breathe and feel”.49 That insight is not part of a refutation of skepticism but rather 
describes what is presupposed by it. 
Hume writes that believing in the deliverances of sense-perception and our 
believing in an independent external world is a pre-rational natural instinct: 
 
 It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, 
 to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost 
 before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe.
50
  
 
This capacity for what commentators have called “natural belief”51 is “antecedently 
implanted in the mind, and render’d unavoidable”.52 However, the “slightest 
philosophy” can destroy the “primary instincts of nature” and lead us to “embrace a 
new system” according to which mind and world are, from this new, detached 
perspective, irrecoverably alienated from one another.
53
  
 In Hume’s presentation the term belief is consistently and deliberately 
employed to characterize this pre-rational natural instinct and that a principal aim of 
Book 1 of the Treatise is to demonstrate how “belief is more properly an act of the 
sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures”.54 This at least indicates, I think, 
that Hume’s naturalism is not the imposition of a scientific way of thinking in an 
attempt to understand our practices. Rather it involves showing how the “maxims of 
common life” are apparently subverted by philosophical commitments driven by a 
___________________________ 
47
 Hume, Treatise, 165. See also Hanfling, “Hume and Wittgenstein”, 59. 
48
 Hume, Enquiries, 151. 
49
 Hume, Treatise, 183. 
50
 Hume, Enquiries, 151. 
51
 Kemp Smith, David Hume, 114. 
52
 Hume, Treatise, 183. 
53
 Hume, Enquiries, 152. 
54
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particular and peculiarly philosophical style of questioning. Put in a Wittgensteinian 
light this subversion affects what is then regarded as acceptable responses to the 
questions that arise. These responses must take the form of explanations of the kind 
Wittgenstein is suspicious of.
55
 Under a restrictive conception of what naturalism 
amounts to one might assume that Hume is imagining that the unavoidable character 
of belief in the external world, say, is a fact that can be respected only by reading into 
the view a kind of proto-Quineanism, an account of belief formation immunized from 
the fruitless endeavour of rational or normative assessment and which instead invokes 
sub-personal mechanical processes.
56
 Yet what Hume is emphasizing, on the 
interpretation suggested here, is that belief-formation is a practical achievement that 
requires immersion in a social world and in common life. “[P]hilosophy.”, writes 
Hume, “finds herself extremely embarrassed” by how toothless our reasoning is in the 
context of responding to skepticism, a skepticism that philosophy animated in the first 
place.
57
 But it is a matter of contention, or at least it should be, what form Hume’s 
naturalism adopts here as a response. The detached perspective of philosophical 
reflection and the skepticism it necessarily induces need not be countered by 
appealing to brute causal processes, as if that is the aspiration of Hume’s science of 
man. Rather, the naturalism prioritizes the origin and role of belief in the context of 
ordinary life which, for Hume, is irreducibly interpersonal.  
What we are given is not some reductive account of belief but a description 
and characterization of a relevant phenomenon, in this context the phenomenology of 
belief. According to Hanfling part of what Hume is doing here is to attend to the 
circumstances in which we acquire beliefs and call something, for example, a cause.
58
 
These are circumstances in which our natural belief is formed and need not require the 
operation of any explicit intellectual endorsement. These are also circumstances 
which are world-involving and interpersonal, not just the circumstances in a person’s 
brain. To say that a caused b is an accomplishment not of reason, nor of any direct 
experience of a worldly cause but of custom which operates, unlike a brute causal 
process, against a background of training provided and regulated by other persons in 
the context of inhabiting a shared world. There are different kinds of belief that 
___________________________ 
55
 The ‘must’ here is a feeling symptomatic of the “causal point of view”. See CV 37. 
56
 See Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized”. 
57
 Hume, Enquiries, 152. 
58
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Wittgenstein discusses and one of them, famously, lies at the “foundation of well-
founded belief” but is itself “not founded” as he describes it in On Certainty.59 Such 
belief, it seems to me, is an ‘echo’ in Strawson’s sense of Hume’s description of the 
role of belief construed as natural instinct. According to Wittgenstein “believing is a 
natural act for humans”60 and one that requires a taken for granted background of 
human life. Despite important differences between Hume and Wittgenstein there is a 
sense in which they are both concerned with what is presupposed by the activity of 
explicit reflection, what is needed in order for our reflection to have a subject matter 
in the first place. This, I have suggested, is constituted by our ordinary experience. 
Wittgenstein regarded the subject matter of philosophy as a priori in a sense that 
marks out empirical investigation as inappropriate for informing philosophical 
thought. But this idea does not encompass ordinary experience to which Wittgenstein 
assigned a fundamental role. 
 
  
Concluding remarks: Naturalism and philosophy 
Wittgenstein’s naturalism can be articulated, as can Hume’s, as a commitment to the 
philosophical importance of ‘the everyday’.61 For both Hume and Wittgenstein the 
everyday is the irreducible context which is presupposed by our questions, doubts, 
reasons and responses and inattentiveness to the taken for granted background of 
ordinary life can lead to a gross distortion of our subject matter. This background to 
our thought and action resists being accommodated from within a naturalistic outlook 
if that outlook is restricted to scientific naturalism. Hume wrote of the philosophical 
importance of “the gross earthy mixture” of common life, Wittgenstein the “rough 
ground” of day to day practice and the “phenomena of every-day”.62 And both 
insisted that we return to this subject matter, to return from the “fairy land”63 of 
metaphysics or to recall language from the “holiday” on which it goes thereby 
generating philosophical problems.
64
   
___________________________ 
59
 OC §253.  
60
 BT 575. 
61
 See Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 10. 
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 Hume, Enquiries, 72. 
64
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 Seen from the point of view of common life, from the perspective of 
embodied, interpersonal experience, philosophical problems (particularly skepticism) 
seem “so cold, strain’d, and ridiculous” as Hume put it.65 But by this Hume was not 
suggesting that philosophy as such is thereby shown to be suspect. Rather, philosophy 
as well as many other aspects of our practices together such as having friends and 
family, working, relaxing, learning, creating, investigating, and so on, are part of what 
a flourishing human life consists in. This reflects how  
 
[N]ature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to human race ... 
Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and 
such as may have a direct reference to action and society.
66
  
 
After warning of the “pensive melancholy [and] endless uncertainty” that “abstruse 
thought and profound researches” will bring on, Hume ends here with the famous 
line: “Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.” Hume 
seemed to think that the mixed kind of life was one that somehow struck a balance 
between the different elements that constitute it and, whilst he did not think that each 
of us is equally suited to or even capable of pursuing philosophical thought, to be 
drawn to philosophical questions was a natural aspect of the human condition. 
According to Hume, reason, which inevitably leads to skeptical questions, is 
nevertheless employed “only because we cannot help it”;67 but even if this is right it 
leaves open the possibility that a liveable balance might be struck between 
philosophical inquiry and the fruitful participation in other activities. The mixed life 
that Hume imagined involved a domestication of reason and so of philosophy; a view 
not so easily accommodated by Wittgenstein.  
According to Williams,  
 
Wittgenstein inherited from Kant a concern with the limits of understanding, 
from Frege and Russell an interest in the conditions of linguistic meaning, and 
___________________________ 
65
 Hume, Treatise, 214.  
66
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67
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from himself a sense of philosophy as a quite peculiar and possibly 
pathological enterprise.
68
  
 
Philosophy may be possibly pathological but not, I take it, because it is philosophy but 
because of a particular conception of its aims and methods or of a particular way of 
inhabiting a philosophical perspective. As discussed Wittgenstein was critical of the 
idea that scientific method is in any way appropriate for identifying and responding to 
philosophical problems. The way that naturalism is now often understood assumes the 
opposite view: that philosophy is or should be part of science in some sense. As I 
have emphasized, what motivates the view that Wittgenstein was anti-naturalist is the 
assimilation of naturalism to a scientific perspective. Whilst we need not countenance 
any such assimilation there is a danger here from the other direction as it were.   
 Wittgenstein regarded the scientific attitude as pervasive, as shaping our very 
conception of what explanation and understanding any phenomena consists in. But 
resisting that can also encourage the idea that the existence of a philosophical problem 
as such is already the product of a mistaken departure from ordinary life. To be sure, 
Wittgenstein saw the difficulties – logical, conceptual, psychological and moral – that 
arose from the misguided ways that explanation and understanding are sought. But 
that reflects how our understanding of thought and practice is under the sway of the 
scientific attitude. Dissolving the general authority that scientific naturalism has been 
granted should not threaten philosophy itself.  
 Williams portrays Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as a possibly 
pathological enterprise as connected to the way the latter is said to have conceived the 
subject matter of philosophy as exclusively a priori. I suggest that that is more or less 
right if understood as a point against assuming the supposed authority of empirical 
explanation. But it cannot easily accommodate the fact that a fundamental subject 
matter of philosophy is an impulse to understand ourselves as embodied practical 
agents. Wittgenstein’s way of contributing to this ambition was to not to regard our 
subject matter as available empirically, yet neither did it assume that it was 
___________________________ 
68
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exclusively a priori. For Wittgenstein, as for Hume, the careful observation of human 
life is central to a compelling version of philosophical naturalism.
69
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